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Reply 
Overruling INS v. Chadha: Advice on Choreography 
SETH BARRETT TILLMAN*   
I should like to thank the editors of Pierce Law Review for making this 
colloquy possible.  Additionally, I should like to thank Professor Sanford 
Levinson for writing on short notice his perceptive and complimentary 
critique,1 to which I reply in part below.  Indeed, his kind words are not so 
much a critique, as an invitation for me to further elaborate on my own 
views.   
Professor Levinson voices two different (but closely related) legal ob-
jections and one prudential objection to my proposed model statute.2  I 
reply to each in turn.   
I. BICAMERALISM AND CHADHA 
As Professor Levinson explains, the core of the Model is to delegate (a 
subset of) Congress’s legislative power to a single house should one house 
continue to function after the other house’s ability to form a quorum (and 
organize) is wiped out by an act of God or an act of war.  The model stat-
ute authorizes the delegation, and any order passed by a single house under 
delegated authority, like the statute itself, must be (separately) presented to 
the President.  A single house cannot act alone.3  Professor Levinson 
  
 *   Mr. Tillman – Harvard Law School, JD (2000), University of Chicago, AB (1984), and former 
law clerk to Judges Jane R. Roth (3d Cir.), William J. Martini (D.N.J.), and Mark E. Fuller (M.D. Al.) 
– is an associate of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, and is a member of the 
Delaware bar.  The views expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the firm or its clients.  
And “[a] special apology is due to those of my [few] friends to whom it will be obvious that, in the 
course of the last few years when I was occupied with wholly different problems, I have not read their 
publications[,] closely related to the subject of this Paper which would probably have taught me much 
from which I could have profited in writing it.”  F.A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argu-
ment Refined 15 (2d ed., Inst. of Econ. Affairs 1978).   
 1. See Sanford Levinson, Comment, Assuring Continuity of Government, 4 Pierce L. Rev. 201 
(2006).   
 2. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Model Continuity of Congress Statute, 4 Pierce L. Rev. 191 (2006) 
[hereinafter Tillman, Model Statute or Model].  The Model is a practical application of the legal and 
parliamentary principles expounded upon in greater detail in my 2005 publication.  See generally 
Tillman, infra n. 5.   
 3. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983) (Burger, C.J.) (holding, on different facts, that 
single-house action, purporting to make binding legal relations, in nonstatutory form, absent bicameral-
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rightly notes: “[n]ot only bedrock constitutional structures of bicameral-
ism, but also the Chadha case, seemingly defeat his proposal.”4  I am very 
glad he distinguishes the two.  Here I only address the Constitution’s bi-
cameralism requirement.  I will return to Chadha at the end of this paper.   
In another place, I (very recently) argued at length, in conjunction with 
opaque (and mind-numbingly long) footnotes, that the Constitution of 1787 
expressly provided for the waiver of bicameralism (but not presentment), 
that such waiver had its roots in general eighteenth century Anglo-
American conceptions of parliamentary supremacy, and that an obscure 
U.S. constitutional provision specifically providing for such waiver was 
analogous to a then long-practiced and still extant (at least in the Com-
monwealth) parliamentary procedure: the financial initiative of the Crown.5   
This is not the place to again rehearse those arguments in any detail.  
For the purposes of this colloquy, I must ask the reader to willingly sus-
pend disbelief,6 and to – at a more leisurely opportunity – assess the evi-
dence, and the critique of that evidence, yourself.7  Here, I will only note 
that a not insubstantial number of scholars from a variety of fields, includ-
ing law, history, and political science, have voiced agreement with the new 
view, and an even larger number of scholars (and legislative officers), al-
though not taking a position one way or another, have cited (or will cite) 
the new view in their publications: indicating that the new view is within 
the bounds of reasonable scholarly opinion.8  Although the larger number 
  
ism and presentment, is unconstitutional).  I point out that in Chadha bicameralism was a possibility 
that Congress chose not to make use of.  Not so here – the Model assumes the loss of one house, and so 
compliance with bicameralism is not possible. 
 4. Levinson, supra n. 1, at 204. 
 5. See generally Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3, 83 
Tex. L. Rev. 1265 (2005).   
 6. See Richard D. Parker, “Here the People Rule”: A Constitutional Populist Manifesto 27, 48-9 
(1994) (asking the reader to reconsider the dominant constitutional narrative through the use of unusual 
literary devices); see also generally Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (1817); J.R.R. 
Tolkien, Tree and Leaf: On Fairy Stories & Leaf by Niggle, in The Tolkien Reader 1-84 (1966).   
 7. Compare Tillman, supra n. 5, with Gary Lawson, Comment, Burning Down the House (and 
Senate), 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1373, 1387 (2005) (“[The Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause] includes 
precisely the single-house action pursuant to prior bicameral legislative authorization for which 
[Tillman] argues.  But. . . .”) (emphasis added), with Seth Barrett Tillman, Reply, The Domain of Con-
stitutional Delegations Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1389 (2005). 
 8. See e.g. Harold Bruff, Balance of Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative State 
223, 267, 478 (2006); Edwin Meese III et al., The Heritage Guide to the Constitution §§ Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 3 and Article V (2005); David Brian Robertson, The Constitution and America’s 
Destiny 219 n. 46 (Cambridge U. Press 2005); Ralph A. Rossum & G. Alan Tarr, American Constitu-
tional Law vol. 1, 140 (7th ed., 2006); Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitu-
tional Law: Substance and Procedure § 10.8 [8] (3d ed., West 2005); Peter M. Shane & Harold H. 
Bruff, Separation of Powers Law: Cases and Materials 176 n. 1 (2d ed., Carolina Academic Press 
2005); John R. Vile, The Constitutional Convention of 1787: A Comprehensive Encyclopedia of Amer-
ica’s Founding 621, 949 (ABC-CLIO 2005); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Materials 789 (4th ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2006); Richard Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 
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of these scholars are, I think, people of a traditional or right of center intel-
lectual bent, the very fact that Professor Levinson is willing to engage in 
this colloquy with me is indicative that the new view also holds substantial 
promise for those of the moderate and/or populist left.9  Admittedly, the 
new view does not enjoy anything approaching universal assent among 
(otherwise) well-informed and well-meaning scholars.10   
For those who are unwilling or unable to grasp the (intellectual) nettle, 
the new view can be concisely summed up as follows:  
Every [final] Order, Resolution, or Vote [of a single house] to 
which the [prior] Concurrence of the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives may be necessary [as bicameral congressional authoriza-
tion for subsequent single-house action] . . . shall be presented to 
the President [so that his veto might act upon the subsequent sin-
gle-house action just as it acted upon the prior authorizing legisla-
  
__ N.M. L. Rev. ___ n. 6 (forthcoming 2007) ; Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitu-
tional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 639, 650 n. 52 (2005); Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons 
and Our Constitution in International Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 10 n. 46 (2005); Yvette 
Barksdale, Recent Articles of Interest, 30 Admin. & Reg. Law News 25, 27 (2005); Jack Michael 
Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 126 n. 306 (2006); Kirsten Matoy 
Carlson, Is Hindsight 20-20? Reconsidering the Importance of Pre-Constitutional Documents, 30 
Am. Indian L. Rev. 1, 5 n. 20 (2006); Ezra Dodd Church, Technological Conservatism: How Informa-
tion Technology Prevents the Law from Changing, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 561, 589 n. 220 (2004); Jide  
Nzelibe, A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution, Nw. U. Law & Economics Research Paper 
No. 05-03, at 20 n. 62 (2005), and 91 Iowa L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2006); Robert Sarvis, Legislative 
Delegation and Two Conceptions of the Legislative Power, 4 Pierce L. Rev. 317, 341 n. 82 (2006); 
see also e.g. Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 and Article V (LEXIS Supp. 2006); Article I, Section 7, 
Clause 3 and Article V (West Supp. 2006); cf. e.g. Email from Professor George W. Carey to Seth 
Barrett Tillman (Mar. 1, 2004) (on file with the Pierce Law Review) (“I find your analysis simply 
compelling.”); Ltr. from Professor Forrest McDonald to Seth Barrett Tillman (Jan. 13, 2004) (on file 
with the Pierce Law Review) (finding new view “historically absolutely convincing”). 
  The editors of a number of government publications have committed to citing the new view.  See 
e.g. Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello, Congressional Research Service, eds., The Constitution of 
the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation §§ Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 and Arti-
cle V (109th Cong. Pub. forthcoming 2006); John Sullivan & Charles W. Johnson, House Parliamen-
tarians, eds., Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives of the 
United States One Hundred Tenth Congress §§ Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 and Article V (U.S. GPO 
Pub., forthcoming 2007).   
 9. On the other hand, if Professor Levinson’s forthcoming book is actually titled: Our Undemo-
cratic Constitution: Where The Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We The People Can Correct It), 
then I am perhaps mistaken in imagining that Professor Levinson’s politics and scholarship are left of 
center.  Would a leftist really commit the People to a mere parenthetical?  See Levinson, supra n. 1, at 
n. 5.   
 10. See e.g. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 563 n. 33 (Random House 
2005) (“Outside the appointments-making context [and the treaty context], joint formal action by the 
president and Senate alone is simply not contemplated by the Constitution; It is of zero legal effect; cf. 
Chadha.”); cf. e.g. Charles L. Black, Jr., Correspondence: On Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 – and the 
Amendment of the Constitution, 87 Yale L.J. 896, 898 (1978) (arguing that Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 
U.S. 378 (1798), was wrongly decided because bicameralism and presentment are hardwired into the 
Constitution); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 Yale 
L.J. 189, 209 (1972) (same).  
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tion] . . . and before the Same [subsequent single-house action] 
shall take Effect [in conformity with the prior authorizing legisla-
tion], shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall 
be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the 
Case of a Bill [which is a different case].11 
II. PROFESSOR LEVINSON’S PRUDENTIAL OBJECTION 
As Professor Levinson correctly explains the Constitution’s floor for a 
quorum, in the event of an attack, is really quite low.  Should only two 
members of the House survive, and should both show up to work: a major-
ity of the House would constitute a quorum to do business, and a majority 
of two is two.  I have often wondered if one of one is sufficient.12  In any 
event, the Model, a mere statute, cannot lower that constitutional floor: it 
cannot countenance a meeting with as few as half the members (then liv-
ing), but it can raise the bar because the statute sets the terms of the delega-
tion.   
In drafting the Model, I chose as a lower boundary for the House forty 
members, and for the Senate twenty members.  Professor Levinson sug-
gests that I have set too low a floor.  He writes: 
There is no good reason to believe that such a rump House would 
be viewed as legitimate, especially if the forty survivors were 
overwhelmingly from one political party or one region of the coun-
try. . . .  Thus I am inclined to require a far higher number than 
forty in order to legitimate the House as a co-participant in govern-
ance.  I would prefer that at least one hundred representatives, 
from a cross-section of our vast country, be available.13 
I leave aside the fantastic difficulty in framing a written fixed rule con-
trolling a presiding legislative officer’s determination that a representative 
cross-section of the membership remains alive following a catastrophic 
attack.  Instead, I focus only on the numbers.  It comes down to this.  Set 
the bar even one member too high and you have nothing: all your planning 
is for naught.  Then you must wait thirty or sixty or as many as ninety 
  
 11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (bracketed language added); see also Lawson, supra n. 7, at 1387 
(generally agreeing that bracketed language explains the original public meaning of the ORV Clause); 
but see supra n. 10 (collecting contrary scholarly authority).   
 12. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (A “Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum. . . .”).  Is 
one of one a majority?  I hope we will never know the answer to that question.   
 13. Levinson, supra n. 1, at 205. 
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days, as determined by varying state election law, for new members to be 
elected so that a quorum might then be had.  Set the bar low and members, 
taking then prevailing circumstances into account, will have discretion not 
to act.14  In all candor, I believe twenty and forty are high, too high.  In 
1789, twelve Senators were sufficient to transact Senate business, and 
thirty members were sufficient for the House to transact House business.  
We are not the same people now, this is not 1789: it is the twenty-first cen-
tury.  But although we may have changed, the principles of representative 
government have not, they are the same today as they were yesterday, and, 
as they will be tomorrow, should we live until tomorrow and should we 
plan for our common tomorrows.15 
Professor Levinson believes that a high bar on House action is likely to 
cost us little because the Senate could always quickly reform per the ap-
pointment process of the Seventeenth Amendment.  He goes as far as to 
suggest that “the Senate could be back up to its full strength of one hun-
dred within a very few days”16  His point is that there is no good reason to 
risk a rump or unrepresentative House, when in short order a full, or nearly 
full, Senate would be up and running.  I wish to God he were correct, but I 
fear he is entirely wrong.  If 9-11 has taught us anything, it must be that we 
must plan for that which cannot be predicted.  We do not know and, in-
deed, we cannot know the shape or contours a future attack on our country 
might take.  We must therefore give our political institutions all the flexi-
bility that we dare.  If the attack were on the Capitol only, or restricted to 
the environs of the capitol district, then Professor Levinson might be cor-
rect.  But the attack might be national or even global in scope.  Anthrax 
perhaps.  State governors might be dead or incapacitated.  State govern-
  
 14. See e.g. The Federalist No. 36, 178 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001) (“There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients, that in the 
ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal.  And the govern-
ment, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making use of       
them. . . .  And as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that 
have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm 
the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for 
the general defense and security.”) (emphasis added). 
 15. Or as Burke put it:  
 
The two principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at the two critical peri-
ods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England found itself without a king.  At both 
those periods the nation had lost the bond of union in their ancient edifice; they did not, 
however, dissolve the whole fabric.  On the contrary, in both cases they regenerated the de-
ficient part of the old constitution through the parts which were not impaired.  They kept 
these old parts exactly as they were, that the part recovered might be suited to them.  They 
acted by the ancient organized [assemblies] in the shape of their old organization. . . . 
 
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 29-30 (London 1790). 
 16. Levinson, supra n. 1, at 202. 
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ments, like the national government, might be in considerable disarray.  
Indeed, the lesson of Katrina might be that such emergencies overwhelm 
state government who will look to the national government for guidance.  
It is our job – as Americans, as lawyers – to see that there is some readily 
identifiable and constitutionally legitimate national government to give 
them that guidance.  To depend on a quickly reformed Senate is to unnec-
essarily throw the dice.   
But I grant that Professor Levinson’s empirical claim might be correct: 
the Senate might quickly reform.  And, in fact, the Model (as written) gives 
him all that he asks.  Under the terms of the Model, neither house acting 
under delegated statutory authority may take unicameral action until ten 
days have passed following the President’s proclamation to meet (or, fol-
lowing any date Congress or its officers schedule a concurrent meeting of 
both chambers).17  So the Model already gives each of us what we ask: 
representativeness (at least such as can be had in our malapportioned Sen-
ate) and energy.   
Perhaps I should stop here, but I think I would be doing Professor Lev-
inson and the reader a great disservice if I left the impression that I shared 
Professor Levinson’s wider moral intuition on this matter.  I do not believe 
that representativeness ought to be the test of good governance in an emer-
gency.  If one house were wiped out, but the other could continue to meet, 
then that would be a tremendous moral and morale victory.  If there were 
enough members to divide and vote, then we will have achieved continuity 
with our political forms, and we will have denied those that would murder 
our leadership the added bonus of (even temporarily) stymieing our politi-
cal system.  Should we have floor debate, transparency, and responsibility, 
then we would have achieved all that could be reasonably desired in such 
horrific circumstances.  Even deliberation should not be a precondition for 
measuring success.  In these circumstances, if we get deliberation, it is 
merely an added bonus.  In an elective assembly, the touchstone of success 
is decision.  
  
 17. See Tillman, supra n. 2, at 192-93, § 1 (building ten day window as a precondition for unicam-
eral action subject to presentment).  Obviously, the choice of ten days is likewise an arbitrary selection 
on my part.  The longer you extend the initial period, the greater opportunity you give Congress to 
reconstitute itself: as incapacitated members recover, as new appointments are made, and as elections 
fill empty slots.  Once reconstituted, under the Model, Congress will return to the constitutional default: 
bicameralism.  But the longer the initial period, the longer you delay lawmaking and oversight: both of 
which may be essential in an emergency.  The judgment here is purely a prudential one.  Cf. e.g. The 
Federalist No. 74, supra n. 14, at 386 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The dilatory process of convening the 
legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would 
frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity.  The loss of a week, a day, an hour, 
may sometimes be fatal.”) (emphasis added).   
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The primary duty of a legislative body is to act.  Debate, even 
when most valuable, is subsidiary.  We ought to have always both 
debate and action, but, if we must choose between them, action 
must have the preference, for endless debate without action would 
soon bring any government into contempt.18   
The Model strives to make decision possible. 
Professor Levinson notes that an effort to achieve representativeness 
which would defeat the Model’s unicameralism might leave the country 
with the Madisonian nightmare:19  the whole of the government committed 
to the President or his successor during the interregnum.20  The Hamilto-
nian nightmare may be the greater risk: absent express grants of authority 
from the rump legislature, the President and federal officers may be unwill-
ing to take measures intimately necessary to our safety and survival.21   
The bicameralism fetish is not demanded by the Constitution’s text.  If 
the fear of unicameralism is that the rump legislature might act without 
sufficient deliberation, then the solution cannot be a temporary presidential 
dictatorship.  The proposed remedy is wholly disconnected from the under-
lying policy concern.  If the fear is lack of representativeness, then the so-
lution is to hold elections with alacrity, not to suspend the remaining rem-
nants of representative government.  I readily admit that such fears fully 
justify limiting the terms of the delegation.  The Constitution limits what 
substantive matters might be subject to unicameral action.22  Likewise, the 
Model limits the prospective legal effect of any unicameral legislation.23  I 
  
 18. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., Parliamentary Obstruction in the United States, in Historical 
and Political Essays 169, 179 (Cambridge 1892); see also Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 
Political Theory 347 (1997).   
 19. The Federalist No. 47, supra n. 14, at 249 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many . . . may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).   
 20. And of course, we might not even get the Madisonian nightmare of presidential despotism.  
Professor Akhil Amar has made unending efforts over many years to convince the widest number that 
legislative officer succession to the presidency, as required by statute in the event of a presidential and 
vice-presidential vacancy, is unconstitutional.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, 
Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, 
America’s Constitution: A Biography, supra n. 10, at 170-73, 340-41, 452-53, 556-57, 598, 625.  Why 
am I not surprised that James Madison is his key early source?  See Tillman, supra n. 5, at 1371-72 
(decrying longstanding dominance of the Madisonian cult).   
  I intend to oppose the Amars’ view in a forthcoming article.  See Seth Barrett Tillman, The 
President of the United States is not an “Officer of the United States” and the Affirmative Case for 
Legislative Officer Succession to the Presidency (forthcoming circa 2007).   
 21. See supra nn. 14, 17. 
 22. See e.g. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (demanding that appropriations must be made “by law,” that 
is exclusively by statutes, subject to bicameralism and presentment).   
 23. See e.g. Tillman, Model Statute, supra n. 2, at 194-95, § 1 (limiting the prospective legal effect 
of unicameral orders, resolutions, and votes to one hundred and twenty days from when statutory 
instrument takes effect).  There are several other such limitations in the Model.   
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am sure other reasonable restrictions might be crafted.  But while debating 
the other great issues of the day24 and overfine points relating to congres-
sional continuity, we do not want our epitaph to read: 
He was a patriot who loved representative democracy & prized public liberty 
— He meant well — 
He thought the good was the enemy of the best. 
The goal then is not to have a conversation, but to decide. 
III. CHADHA REDUX 
As I am a legal traditionalist, to me the most damning of Professor 
Levinson’s objections is that even if the Model were reasonably drafted, 
Congress, the President, and the public cannot be confident that any action 
taken under the Model will be upheld by the federal courts.25  Indeed, it is 
only after the emergency has struck that the Model could be put to the test, 
tried by actual litigation contesting its constitutionality.  And then it is too 
late to correct any defect in the Model, Chadha-related or otherwise, that 
the courts might discover. 
I am tempted to give a formalistic answer to Professor Levinson’s cri-
tique.  I could point out that there is settled (and recent) supreme court 
jurisprudence establishing that a point not argued is a point not held.26  I 
am tempted to argue that Chadha’s bicameralism rationale standing alone 
  
 24. See William Congreve, The Double Dealer Act I, Scene I (1694) (“They are at the end of the 
gallery; retired to their tea and scandal, according to their ancient custom.”). 
 25. See Levinson, supra n. 1, at n. 22 and accompanying text.   
 26. As Chief Justice Marshall put it: 
 
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be 
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.  If they go beyond 
the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit 
when the very point is presented for decision.  The reason of this maxim is obvious.  The 
question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.  
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case 
decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated. 
 
Cohens v. Va., 19 U.S. 264, 399-400 (1821).   
  Even more recent supreme court jurisprudence is readily available.  See also e.g. Ashbourne 
Holdings Ltd. v. An Bord Pleanala & Cork County Council, [2003] 2 I.R. 114 (Ir.) (Hardiman, J.) 
(“[T]he question of vires to require public access was never raised or discussed, and a point not argued 
is a point not decided.”); cf. e.g. U.S. v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“The [common law] rule that points not argued will not be considered is more than just a 
prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes our 
adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one.”).   
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(and apart from the presentment rationale27) need not control any future 
litigation under the Model.  I am tempted to do so, but I will not.  I regret 
that formalism carries little weight both with most law review readers and 
with the largest part of the federal judiciary, including our nine robed mas-
ters on high. 
So let us assume that Professor Levinson is correct: with regard to the 
lower federal courts, Chadha would control future litigation attacking the 
Model and unicameral orders, resolutions, and votes passed pursuant to the 
Model.  The Model and subsidiary single-house legislation would be struck 
down until Chadha is overruled or limited by the Supreme Court.   
Getting the Supreme Court of the United States to overrule Chadha 
can be achieved relatively quickly, although at first blush, many readers 
will (wrongly) suspect that my proposed solution is a joke.   
*** 
When Congress next authorizes, by statute, salary increases for the up-
per echelon of the federal civil service and elected federal office-holders, 
as it does from time to time, Congress should leave out the judges and the 
Justices. 28  
The latter will get their salary increase, along with everyone else, but 
not by statute per se.  Rather, Congress, by a first-in-time statute, should 
authorize one house by a single-house order or orders (subject to present-
ment) to raise judicial salaries up to some maximum amount.  The statute 
should further specify that no increase in judicial compensation is to take 
effect (or to be construed as Congress’s intent), that no appropriation from 
the Treasury is to be made, and that no increased salary is to be paid except 
as authorized by a constitutionally valid, legally enforceable, and judicially 
cognizable next-in-time congressional order (or orders), authorized under 
the terms of the prior statute, and separately presented to the President.29  
  
 27. See supra n. 3.  And it was only Chadha’s presentment rationale, not the bicameralism rationale, 
that had any actual support within roughly contemporaneous originalist materials, i.e., in Madison’s 
federal convention debate notes.  See James Madison, Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention 
of 1787, in The Debates in the Several States on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution vol. 5, at 431-
32 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881).   
 28. See e.g. An Act to Authorize Salary Adjustments for Justices and judges of the United States for 
Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-167, § 1, 117 Stat. 2031 (Dec. 6, 2003) (granting a raise in judicial 
compensation, although not through the vehicle of an appropriations act).  
 29. Contra Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.  For this gambit to work, Congress must make absolutely clear 
that judicial compensation is only raised if the underlying statute and its expenditure order are both 
valid legal instruments, capable, through joint action, of changing legal relations beyond the confines of 
Congress, its members and employees.  See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“[Judicial] [C]ompensation . . . 
shall not be diminished. . . .”).  The message must be: There are no congressional free lunches.  If 
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Congress should then pass the relevant order or orders and present it or 
them to the President. 
The President should sign the statute, and the President should sign the 
single-house order or orders authorizing the pay increase for the judiciary.  
But afterwards the President should seek the advice of the Office of Legal 
Counsel (“OLC”): the OLC will undoubtedly explain to the President that 
under settled Supreme Court precedent increasing the judges’ salaries by 
the proposed method is unconstitutional.30  Acting on the advice of coun-
sel, the President should order the relevant Executive Branch officials not 
to pay the judges and Justices their statutorily approved but “unconstitu-
tionally” increased wages.   
In these circumstances, I am serenely confident that at least one federal 
judge will sue for his wages.  I am equally confident that the lower federal 
courts will hear the suit.31  And, perhaps, a courageous federal judge might 
also act as class representative under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
and seek vindication for all of his colleagues.32  I would advise the class 
representative not to act as his own counsel, if only because there can be 
no doubt that litigators from the largest number of very posh firms will 
rush to volunteer to act pro bono on behalf of the very adjudicators to 
whom they are destined to appear.  I have no doubt that the Supreme Court 
will hear the case, particularly if Congress creates an expedited review 
procedure or mandatory jurisdiction.33  And I think it substantially more 
likely than not that Chadha would be overruled, or limited to its facts, par-
ticularly if Congress makes pellucidly clear that all future attempts to raise 
judicial salaries will be made via alternative statutory instruments: single-
house orders, resolutions, and votes subject to presentment and authorized 
  
Congress is unwilling to be bold, quick, loud and clear, then our judicial ruling class might not hear 
them.  See supra n. 6. 
 30. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. 
 31. See U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980) (holding that the doctrine of necessity permits federal 
judges to hear cases affecting their own compensation, notwithstanding the inherent conflict of inter-
est); but see Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65 
Fordham L. Rev. 1657, 1661 (1997) (“Another deep principle [of the Constitution] is that a person is 
not supposed to be a judge in his own case.”) (emphasis added); Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents Without 
Mandates, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 375, 385 (1999) (“Thus the [Presidential Succession] Act of 1792 had the 
obvious potential for corrupting judicial judgment [in the impeachment context], effectively making 
[Senator] Wade a judge in his own case [when deciding to vote to convict or to acquit President An-
drew Johnson], giving him an obvious conflict of interest [because he would succeed Johnson, if the 
latter were convicted].”) (emphasis added); Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson 
Counts Himself Into The Presidency, 90 Va. L. Rev. 551, 556 n. 13 (2005) (“The Founders had demon-
strated a general awareness of the problems of asking an official to serve as a judge in his own case.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 32. There would be those few federal judges who, under a particular view of the Constitution and 
their oaths (or affirmations), might wish not to participate in this litigation.  And, of course, they could 
opt out.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (providing for opt-outs).   
 33. See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000) (providing for mandatory appeal).   
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(or ratified) by a prior (or subsequent) statute.  (Perhaps Congress might 
express its considered opinion in the form of a well-reasoned nonbinding 
concurrent resolution?)   
But why stop there?  Both legislation and litigation are difficult, time 
consuming, and expensive processes.  Since we have taken the time to cho-
reograph a lawsuit between the Executive Branch and the judiciary,34 this 
would be a particularly appropriate time to seek resolution (no pun in-
tended) of other outstanding constitutional issues by carefully designing 
multiple (closely related) fact patterns for the Supreme Court to adjudi-
cate.35  
Still even with several permutations on appeal to the Supreme Court, I 
believe the litigation could be wrapped up relatively quickly.  Federal dis-
trict court proceedings will be swift because there will be few, if any, 
depositions, i.e., the key issue will be a pure matter of law.  Perhaps we 
might even arrange for a caesarian section and bypass the intermediate 
  
 34. I expect that each house of Congress would intervene and/or file amicus briefs in defense of 
their own legislative authority.  Also, in passing the salary increase, Congress must waive Section 8 of 
the Model Statute, else the Executive Branch would be inhibited from making an ultra vires or non-
delegation doctrine based defense.  See Tillman, Model Statute, supra n. 2, at 199-200, § 8. 
  Although I hope to see the Executive Branch fail in arguing against the constitutionality of 
single-house delegation, it is important that the fight be free and fair so that thereafter the new prece-
dent will clearly control the course of all future litigation.   
 35. Here are a few of my favorite constitutional chestnuts.  Let’s say Congress ultimately intends to 
give the federal judges a $6,000 annual raise.  Then $3,000 should be awarded by House orders and 
$3,000 should be awarded by Senate orders.  Each house should issue six orders for $500 each.   
  The first $500 order should be presented to the President and signed while Congress remains in 
session. 
  The second order should be presented to the President prior to ten days before Congress’s end of 
session adjournment, but it should neither be signed nor vetoed by the President. 
  The third one should be passed prior to adjournment, but presented and signed shortly after 
termination of Congress’s two year session.   
  The fourth one should be presented, vetoed, and returned during a session, but overridden by 
two-thirds of each house. 
  A fifth one should be pocket vetoed during an intrasession break, “returned” exclusively for 
congressional record-keeping and informational purposes, but “overridden” when Congress subse-
quently returns, notwithstanding Congress’s technical absence ten days following presentment. 
  A sixth one should be pocket vetoed during an intersession break, i.e., between two annual 
sessions of a two-year Congress, “returned” exclusively for congressional record-keeping and informa-
tional purposes, but “overridden” when Congress subsequently returns, notwithstanding Congress’s 
absence ten days following presentment. 
  Of course, a variety of other factual permutations are possible which would allow for adjudica-
tion of yet unanswered and unsettled questions pertaining to the constitutional boundaries of the legis-
lative process (or, at least, the high judiciary’s distorted views of that process).  Cf. The Federalist 
No. 48, supra n. 14, at 256-57 (James Madison) (overdramatically describing “[t]he legislative depart-
ment” as “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex.”) (emphasis added); but cf. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Paro-
chial Congress, 53 UCLA L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2006).   
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federal court of appeals.36  With a bit of luck, we could be blessed with a 
new Supreme Court ruling prior to ever having to use the Model in a genu-
ine national emergency.   
*** 
On second thought, I have changed my mind.  That salary increase by 
single-house order (subject to presentment) – it should apply exclusively to 
the lower federal court judges.  Congress should grant the Justices of the 
Supreme Court their salary increase by statute.  I am sure the sophisticated 
reader will readily see that this would only greatly increase the pressure on 
the high court.  And if we are going to stick the sword in, we might just as 
well twist it a bit and have a bit of fun.   
  
 36. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006) (permitting federal intermediate court of appeals to certify 
question to Supreme Court, and permitting Supreme Court to have the entire case sent up for its deci-
sion, notwithstanding that the lower court had not yet issued a final judgment on appeal).   
